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Simmons’ Critique of Natural Duty Approaches 
to the Duty to Obey the Law
David Lefkowitz
University of North Carolina–Greensboro
In his most recent book on the moral duty to obey the law, 
A. John Simmons considers and rejects a number of natural 
duty approaches to justifying political authority.1 Among the 
targets of Simmons’ criticism is the account defended by the 
book’s co-author, Christopher Heath Wellman.2 In this essay, 
I evaluate the force of Simmons’ objections to Wellman’s 
account of political obligation. As will become clear below, I 
think Wellman’s defense of the duty to obey the law defective 
in certain ways—but not in all of the ways that Simmons argues 
it is. By rebutting some of Simmons’ criticisms and identifying 
the limits of others, I aim not only to indicate one direction in 
which a renewed defense of natural duty approaches to political 
obligation might proceed, but also to encourage the pursuit of 
such a philosophical project.3
Simmons levels three main challenges to Wellman’s 
samaritan account of the duty to obey the law. First, he 
questions the existence of a samaritan duty as Wellman 
characterizes it, arguing that it is a strange hybrid of a samaritan 
duty as understood in paradigm cases of easy rescue and 
an imperfect duty of charity. Second, Simmons argues that 
Wellman cannot account for the particularity of the duty to 
obey the law; that is, the fact that an agent’s alleged moral 
duty to obey the law is almost always conceived to be owed 
to a particular state, usually the one in which the agent enjoys 
legal citizenship. Third, Simmons contends that Wellman’s 
argument fails to demonstrate that agents have a duty to obey 
the law of their state; rather, at best it entails that most agents 
will often, but not always, have good reason to comply with 
the law.4 In response, I argue for the following conclusions. 
Simmons’ first criticism is correct, but the (alleged) moral 
duty Wellman employs as the foundation for his argument 
can easily be replaced by some other (genuine) natural moral 
duty or duties. Simmons’ second criticism is also correct, but 
it only establishes one conclusion that he has long advocated, 
namely, philosophical anarchism, and not another, namely, 
that consent is the only possible means whereby a state can 
come to enjoy authority over an individual, and that individual 
a correlative duty to obey the law. Simmons’ third criticism 
is incorrect; Wellman does demonstrate that if agents have a 
moral duty to support the specifically political institutions that 
comprise their state, then their support ought to take the form 
of obedience to its law.
I.
I begin with a much abbreviated reconstruction of Wellman’s 
argument for the duty to obey the law.5
1. All moral agents have a natural duty to rescue others 
from significant harms as long as the cost of doing so 
is reasonable. Call this a samaritan duty, or duty of easy 
rescue.
2. The perils of a Hobbesian state of nature constitute a 
significant harm.  
3. Therefore, as long as the cost is reasonable, all moral 
agents have a samaritan duty to save others from the 
perils of a Hobbesian state of nature (or, as Simmons 
sometimes writes, a duty to provide security for all). 
(From 1 and 2.)
4. Only specifically political institutions—or, more 
controversially, the modern state—provide(s) a 
reliable defense against the perils of a Hobbesian state 
of nature.
5. Therefore, as long as the cost is reasonable, agents 
have a samaritan duty to support the state, since only 
by doing so can they rescue others from the perils of 
a Hobbesian state of nature. (From 3 and 4.) 
6. If the benefits that the state provides each individual 
are taken into account, the cost to each of them of 
supporting the state is a reasonable one.6
7. Therefore, agents have a samaritan duty to support 
the state. (From premises 5 and 6.)7
As Wellman recognizes, however, protection from the perils 
of a Hobbesian state of nature can be accomplished with less 
than universal support for the state. What the argument thus far 
implies is that some agents have a samaritan duty to support 
the state (specifically, whatever number of agents suffices in a 
particular case to ensure that the state succeeds in providing 
protection from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature). What 
it does not show is that each agent has a duty to support the state 
in every case. In order to establish this conclusion, Wellman 
adds another premise:
8. All those with a duty to rescue others from the perils of 
a Hobbesian state of nature ought to contribute their 
fair share to the achievement of this goal.
Thus, even if my failure to support the state has no effect 
on the provision of security for all, I still act wrongly because I 
treat unfairly those who do support the state. It is only because 
they do so that my failure to support the state does not wrong 
those who have a claim against me that they not suffer the 
harms likely to occur in the state of nature. Since there is no 
morally relevant distinction between those who support the 
state and me—we all bear the same samaritan duty—I have no 
justification for according myself a privilege I can enjoy only as 
long as they do not. Therefore,
9. Agents have a samaritan duty to do their fair share in 
supporting the state. (From 5, 6, and 8.)
It still remains to be shown, however, that every agent’s 
contribution of his or her fair share of support for the state 
must take the form of obedience to law. After all, just as the 
state can provide security for all even in the face of a limited 
number of non-contributors, so too it can accomplish this goal 
even when a limited number of those who support it do so by 
means other than obedience to law, or who choose instead to 
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support some other state. To address this point, Wellman once 
again appeals to fairness:
10. Discretion with respect to the form an agent’s support 
for her state will take, or which state she will support, is 
something all agents have reason to value.8 Given this, 
and given that only a limited exercise of such discretion 
is compatible with the state’s provision of security for 
all, it follows that any agent who unilaterally exercises 
some of this limited discretion treats unfairly the other 
members of her state—i.e., those who by forgoing the 
exercise of this discretion (which they have reason to 
value) make it possible for this defector to act as she 
does without undermining the provision of security for 
all.
Wellman concludes, therefore, that:
11. All moral agents have a duty to obey the law of their 
state. (From 9 and 10.)
II.
Simmons’ first objection to Wellman’s argument concerns the 
claim that the duty to save others from the perils of a Hobbesian 
state of nature is but one instance of the more general samaritan 
duty to rescue others from significant harms when the cost 
of doing so is not unreasonable. Paradigmatic cases of easy 
rescue involve statistically abnormal threats of immediate or 
imminent harm, and given their statistical abnormality (both 
in terms of how many people suffer the (risk of) harm and 
how often anyone does so) such cases usually involve a rather 
limited number of agents. In contrast, the perils of a Hobbesian 
state of nature that Wellman invokes to justify a duty to obey 
the law are statistically normal, the harm at issue is a future, 
potential, one, and the number of people with either a right to 
be rescued or a duty to rescue, or both, is (almost) limitless. 
There seems to be good reason to doubt, therefore, that the 
duty to provide security is an instance of the general samaritan 
duty of easy rescue.
Indeed, Simmons argues convincingly that Wellman’s 
account of the duty to obey the law rests on an odd hybrid duty 
that combines elements of both a samaritan duty of easy rescue 
and a duty of charity. The localized nature of the duty to provide 
security (i.e., the claim that agents have a duty to rescue their 
compatriots), and the fact that those in need of rescue from the 
perils of a Hobbesian state of nature have a right to it, follow if 
the duty is a genuine samaritan one.9 The fact that the duty to 
provide security is owed to all members of an agent’s political 
community (and not just those he interacts with face-to-face), 
and that it involves the prevention of a potential, future, harm, 
which is a perennial rather than periodic threat, follow if the 
duty is one of charity. Simmons concludes that “the specific 
form of Wellman’s duty seems to be inspired primarily by his 
argumentative needs, not by independent reasons to believe 
such a duty exists.”10 Moreover, he maintains that as they are 
commonly conceived, neither the duty of easy rescue nor the 
duty of charity can provide a foundation upon which Wellman 
can construct a defense of the duty to obey the law. The 
elements Wellman takes from the other duty in constructing 
his hybrid indicate those features that each of these duties lack, 
but that are necessary for the success of his argument.
Though I think this first objection Simmons raises to 
Wellman’s account correct, it is easy enough to see how 
Wellman’s argument might be modified to avoid it. Rather 
than basing the argument on an alleged duty of easy rescue, 
Wellman could instead appeal to a certain conception of those 
duties correlative to all agents’ basic moral (or human) rights. 
The conception I have in mind is one that understands the 
fulfillment of these duties to include positive acts of provision 
as well as negative acts of forbearance.11 On such a conception 
of people’s basic moral rights, the duty to provide others with 
security (or the secure enjoyment of their basic moral rights) 
requires that an agent do more than simply refrain from acts 
that directly undermine others’ security, such as assaulting 
them. In addition, agents must take positive steps to see to it 
that all enjoy security, say by contributing to the creation and 
preservation of institutions that enforce people’s basic moral 
rights, such as a moderately just police force.12 Note that the 
duties of positive provision that correlate to people’s basic moral 
rights differ from the duty of charity Simmons describes. The 
objects of the former are things or forms of treatment owed 
to particular people (i.e., each of the agents with a right to it), 
while the object of the latter (whatever it may be in a particular 
case) is not.13 Furthermore, insofar as it is an imperfect duty, 
charity is not something an agent must display in every situation 
where it is possible for him to do so; rather, morality permits 
an agent to act on a non-moral reason (such as self-interest) 
in some percentage of these situations. In contrast, the duties 
of positive provision correlative to people’s basic moral rights 
are perfect ones, meaning that unless such duties are defeated 
by other moral considerations, agents must carry them out in 
every situation where it is possible for them to do so.
The replacement of Wellman’s hybrid duty with the duties 
correlative to people’s basic moral rights—henceforth, for 
brevity’s sake, the duty to promote basic rights—appears to only 
exacerbate the challenge to all natural duty approaches that 
samaritanism was supposed to address, namely, accounting 
for the particularity of the duty to obey the law. Of course, if 
Simmons argues correctly when he contends that there is no 
reason to accept the existence of the hybrid duty Wellman 
describes, as I believe he does, then nothing has been lost 
if we substitute for it the duty to promote basic rights, even 
if an argument premised on the latter duty cannot justify a 
particularized duty to obey the law. Simmons will likely reject 
the rough sketch of the duty to promote basic rights I offer here, 
especially the idea that all moral agents owe natural duties of 
positive provision to all moral persons, and not just those with 
whom they have transacted in certain ways (e.g., to whom 
they have made a promise), or that they can easily rescue, or 
to whom they owe reparation. Unlike Wellman’s hybrid duty, 
however, something similar to the duty to promote basic rights as 
I characterize it is defended by a significant number of theorists 
and practitioners (e.g., non-governmental organizations such 
as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). Moreover, 
many of those who defend it do so without any thought of the 
role it might play in a defense of the moral duty to obey the law; 
indeed, for all I know, some defenders of the duty to promote 
basic rights may be philosophical anarchists. Obviously, these 
facts do not demonstrate the truth of a duty to promote basic 
rights as I have characterized it here. But they do render such 
a duty secure against the kind of objection Simmons makes to 
Wellman’s hybrid duty, namely, that there is no reason to believe 
that such a duty exists other than the role it plays in a defense 
of political obligation.
Moreover, as Simmons makes clear, even if we grant 
Wellman his hybrid duty, he still cannot justify an agent’s duty 
to support his particular state (and so a duty to provide that 
support in the form of obedience to his state’s law). The duty 
in question is owed to all those vulnerable to the perils of a 
Hobbesian state of nature, not just those who are vulnerable 
and who happen to be legal subjects (or citizens) of the same 
state as the agent. Even if we assume that the fulfillment of the 
duty to provide security requires agents to support specifically 
political institutions, it seems quite likely that some agents, 
some of the time, will be able to contribute equally or better 
to the provision of security for all by supporting political 
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institutions other than those that comprise their own state. 
As Simmons points out, Wellman and others cannot appeal 
to considerations of fairness in order to meet this challenge; 
that is, they cannot argue that even though support for some 
other political institution contributes just as much or more 
to the morally mandatory end, it also involves treating my 
fellow citizens unfairly, and so I ought not to do it—or, in other 
words, that I have a moral duty to support my particular state. 
Considerations of fairness arise only amongst those with a duty 
to participate in the collective pursuit or realization of some 
end. Yet, thus far, neither Wellman nor any other defender of a 
natural duty approach has provided a compelling explanation 
for why an agent’s fulfillment of his natural duty requires that he 
contribute to the particular collective action scheme (broadly 
construed) that partly constitutes the state of which that agent 
is a legal subject or citizen.
To repeat, an individual accused of treating his compatriots 
unfairly when he elects to promote security for all by sending 
money to the United Nations instead of paying taxes to his state 
can respond as follows. I only treat you unfairly if I have a duty 
to do my fair share of providing security for all by supporting our 
particular state. But you have not shown that I must adopt this 
particular means for carrying out my duty to provide security for 
all. It seems extremely unlikely that you can do so on empirical 
grounds; for example, by demonstrating that I can only fulfill this 
duty by supporting my particular state, or even that support for 
my state will always provide a far superior (i.e., more effective 
and/or more efficient) means for doing so, even if it is not the 
only means to that end.14 It seems equally unlikely that you 
can do so on moral grounds by showing that I have a special 
obligation to my compatriots, say one grounded in consent or 
my occupying the legal role or office of citizen.15 Of course, 
you might invoke a (sui generis) moral duty to rescue one’s 
fellow citizens from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature, 
but doing so settles the matter of particularity by fiat, rather than 
by rational argument.
In short, Simmons’ criticism of Wellman’s defense of the 
duty to obey the law on the grounds that it cannot account 
for that duty’s particularity strikes home even if we grant the 
existence of the hybrid duty on which Wellman bases his 
argument. Nor will Wellman’s argument fare any better if we 
replace that hybrid duty with a duty to promote basic rights. 
I consider elsewhere the ability of a natural duty approach 
that assigns a central place to democracy to account for the 
particularity of the duty to obey the law.16 Here, however, I want 
to consider the implications for Wellman’s argument of his 
inability to demonstrate that an agent’s fulfillment of his natural 
duty (whatever exactly it is) must take the form of support for 
his particular state.
This shortcoming in Wellman’s account of political 
obligation does not eliminate it as a genuine justification for 
the moral duty to obey the law. Rather, it entails that agents 
can come to have such a duty on something like the grounds 
Wellman appeals to only in a world with a single legal system. 
Assume for the moment that in order to fulfill their natural duty 
to others, agents must support specifically political institutions, 
and that their support must take the form of obedience to law. 
If all humanity is subject to a single legal system, then given 
these assumptions an agent will be able to fulfill his duty only 
by obeying the law of this single, global, state. In such a world, 
all agents will have a moral duty to obey the law.17 Insofar as the 
world is not currently organized as a single state or legal system, 
this response to the particularity challenge commits Wellman to 
the conclusion Simmons defends in their recent book, namely, 
philosophical anarchism. This is the view that few if any subjects 
of existing states have a general moral duty to obey the law of 
those states. Yet, while Simmons is sometimes concerned to 
defend only philosophical anarchism, at other times he defends 
a stronger conclusion, namely, that the only possible means by 
which a political institution can come to enjoy a morally justified 
claim to authority over any individual is via that person’s consent 
to its rule.18 However, the particularity requirement does not 
appear to rule out as impossible Wellman’s account of political 
obligation, or a version of it that replaces the hybrid duty to 
rescue others from the perils of a Hobbesian state of nature 
with a duty to promote basic rights. It seems worth considering, 
therefore, the validity of Simmons’ third criticism of Wellman’s 
argument for the duty to obey the law.19
Simmons contends that even if he grants “that I am morally 
bound to do my fair share in preventing the local emergency of 
lawlessness,” it does not follow that he has a moral duty to obey 
the law. This is so because obedience to law is but one method 
of responding to the emergency, which is not lawlessness 
itself, but rather the harm (or perhaps vulnerability to harm) 
that people suffer in the absence of law (i.e., in a Hobbesian 
state of nature). Simmons argues that he could carry out his 
duty by directly providing security for himself and two or three 
others in need of it, perhaps “fancifully, by building a secure 
compound in which I invite some others to stay.”20 In fact, 
Simmons is unwilling to grant Wellman even this much; as he 
goes on to ask:
Why can I not simply do the duty described by 
Wellman just by scrupulously refraining from violence 
(deception, etc.) toward others (and letting others see 
my intention in this regard), while acknowledging no 
duty at all to obey the law? Since legal coercion and a 
sense of duty can assure my fellow citizens of my doing 
no more than this in any event, how can it be that my 
anarchist refusal to obey constitutes a failure to do my 
part in contributing to the security of all?21
Both of these objections follow from a purely instrumental 
interpretation of Wellman’s argument; that is, Simmons 
understands Wellman to be claiming that agents must contribute 
their fair share to the provision of local security—that is an end 
they are morally required to promote—and argues that Wellman 
does not show obedience to law to be a necessary means to that 
end. As I will now demonstrate, however, Wellman’s argument 
for the duty to obey the law is not a purely instrumental one.22
Consider, first, Simmons’ claim that he can contribute his 
fair share to the provision of local security simply by refraining 
from acts that directly violate others’ rights, and making clear to 
others that he will do so. As I indicated earlier, I believe (and I 
think Wellman does as well) that the provision of local security 
requires that agents do more than simply refrain from certain 
sorts of rights-violating conduct. In addition, it requires support 
for institutions that enforce people’s rights, such as a police 
force, and institutions that determine when people’s rights 
have been violated, such as courts. Standards of justice for the 
latter sort of institution, such as a (defeasible) prohibition on ex 
post facto conviction, entail the moral necessity of institutions 
that provide publicly accessible rules defining what sorts of 
conduct will be viewed as rights-violating; in other words, a 
legislative body. At the very least, then, an agent will have to 
contribute a share of the resources necessary for the creation 
and maintenance of such institutions; that is, pay a tax and 
perhaps take a turn in one or more of the offices in these 
institutions.
At least for the sake of argument, however, Simmons 
appears willing to grant that doing one’s fair share in the 
provision of local security requires positive action, and not 
merely refraining from acts that directly violate others’ rights. 
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He denies, however, that this positive action must take the 
form of obedience to law; for example, the payment of taxes. 
Rather, Simmons maintains that an agent could contribute his 
fair share to the provision of local security by directly protecting 
a few people from the rights-violating conduct of others. It may 
appear that Wellman can rebut this claim simply by appealing to 
the following two reasons he gives as part of his justification for 
the state. First, even well-intentioned and conscientious agents 
will likely reasonably disagree as to what counts as the adequate 
provision of security to (local) others, and/or what counts as 
doing one’s fair share of that task. Second, such agents are also 
likely to suffer from, or be perceived to be suffering from, various 
biases when they serve as judges in disputes to which they are 
a party. In the absence of specifically political institutions—i.e., 
ones that provide a relatively neutral (and, therefore, to some 
extent, just) method for settling disagreements like those just 
mentioned (at least for action-guiding purposes), applying 
those settlements to particular cases, and enforcing them when 
necessary—the practically inevitable result will be frequent 
harmful (or rights-violating) conflicts. Thus, it is not possible 
to contribute one’s fair share to the provision of local security 
by means other than adherence to law (or, more precisely, the 
law that governs local relations).23
Yet, Simmons will counter that as long as a sufficient 
number of people do their fair share of providing local security 
by obeying the law, the considerations Wellman points to 
will not suffice to show that he must obey it. Rather, a limited 
number of agents, including Simmons, will be able to fulfill their 
duty by means other than obedience to law. In some cases, we 
may suppose, there will be no disagreement between Simmons 
and the law as to what justice requires, either in the abstract or 
in a particular case. In other cases, Simmons might think the 
law mistaken, but also think that given widespread compliance 
with the law and the likely consequences for him and those he 
protects should he act contrary to it, what he morally ought to 
do, all things considered, is act as the law demands. In these 
cases Simmons will have a moral reason to comply with the law, 
but not to obey it. Finally, in some cases Simmons may think the 
law mistaken, and believe with good reason that disobedience 
to it will not result in any harm, either to him and those he 
protects, or to others, or to the state’s ability to provide security. 
In these cases, Simmons will have neither a moral reason to 
obey the law, nor a moral reason to comply with it.
To claim that an agent has a moral duty to obey the law is 
to claim that he has a (perhaps prima facie) duty to do what the 
law demands simply because the law demands it. In contrast, 
to claim that an agent has a moral reason to comply with the 
law is to claim that he has a moral reason to act as the law 
demands, but not because the law demands that he so act. 
As was just indicated, an agent can deny the law’s claim to 
authority, and at the same time acknowledge that he is morally 
required to act as a particular law would have him act because 
he has independent moral reasons to do so (as in the case of 
a law prohibiting murder) or because contingent factors such 
as patterns of coordination established by the law (and/or 
the state’s coercive enforcement of it) entail that, all things 
considered, the morally best act for the agent to do is the one 
the law demands from him.24 Simmons’ claim, again, is that at 
best Wellman’s argument shows that he will sometimes, but 
not always, have a moral reason to comply with the law. It does 
not show that he has a duty to obey it.
Simmons fails to recognize, however, that considerations 
of fairness play two distinct roles in Wellman’s argument. First, 
as Simmons notes, fairness figures centrally in the specification 
of the end morality requires each agent to promote. Each agent 
must contribute his or her fair share to the provision of (local) 
security. But second, fairness—or treating others fairly—also 
figures essentially in Wellman’s argument that each agent’s 
contribution must take the form of obedience to law. Wellman 
grants that cases are likely to arise in which either (a) an agent 
can do an equal or better job of supporting the state (and so 
providing local security) by acting contrary to the law, or (b) 
that it will make no difference to the existence and efficacy of 
the state (and so to the provision of security for all) whether or 
not the agent complies with the law. However, in both cases 
an agent’s acting contrary to the law is compatible with the 
state’s provision of security for all only because a significant 
number of agents comply with it. In other words, the liberty 
or discretion to act contrary to the law cannot be enjoyed 
simultaneously by all, and therefore, Wellman argues, it would 
be unfair for any particular agent to unilaterally exercise the 
discretion that is possible for some, but not all, to enjoy when 
all have an equal claim to it. Note that the unfairness follows 
from the unilateral exercise of discretion to which all have a 
claim but that some can enjoy only as long as others do not. 
Presumably Wellman will not object if the limited exercise of 
discretion compatible with the effective provision of security by 
the state is distributed by a fair procedure, such as a fair lottery 
or a majority rule decision procedure in which all have an equal 
vote. The problem is that the unilateral exercise of this limited 
discretion is not such a procedure.
Some might argue that a first-come first-served principle 
for distributing the limited discretion at issue also counts as a 
fair distribution, since it is “unclaimed” and so open to all.25 
This claim strikes me as false. Even if natural resources can 
be accurately described as unclaimed until some agent does 
something to take possession of them, and thereby acquire 
a right to them, the same is not true of the limited discretion 
at issue here. This is so because that discretion—that is, the 
possibility of acting contrary to law without failing in one’s 
samaritan duty to contribute one’s fair share to the provision 
of (local) security—obtains only because enough other agents 
comply with the law. In other words, those other agents 
collectively create the discretion in question, and, therefore, 
decisions about how it ought to be distributed must be made 
collectively or, as I argue elsewhere, via a procedure that gives 
each of the agents that (ought to and do) play a part in creating 
it equal authority to settle this matter.26 Note that no agent can 
justify acting contrary to law by claiming that he is exercising 
only his fair share of discretion, since this requires that he act 
on the very sort of unilateral judgments (e.g., regarding the 
existence of limited discretion, and what counts as a fair share) 
that agents must foreswear acting on in order to treat (local) 
others fairly.
The duty to obey the law follows from the moral 
requirement that agents treat fairly those with whom they 
act in order to provide security for all. As Simmons himself 
acknowledges elsewhere, the duty to treat others fairly is a 
matter of respect for others’ status as moral agents.27 As such, 
it is not justified on instrumental grounds; for example, merely 
because it is a means to a state of affairs in which all those 
with a right to it enjoy security. Thus, obedience to law is not 
owed to others because they are vulnerable to various harms 
or wrongs likely to occur in a Hobbesian state of nature; rather, 
it is owed to others because they have an equal claim to the 
discretion made possible by the fact that the law can tolerate 
a limited amount of disobedience. By obeying the law, agents 
acknowledge their compatriots’ equal claim, and so their equal 
status as moral agents.
Simmons only briefly acknowledges this second role that 
fairness plays in Wellman’s defense of the duty to obey the 
law, and he clearly does not appreciate its non-instrumental 
character. He writes: 
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obedience is only a means to general enjoyment 
of the good of security…the fact (if it is a fact) that 
everyone’s using his discretion in genuinely trying 
to treat others well would cause chaos [does not 
effect the conclusion that] if one can do one’s part 
in promoting that good without obeying the law, one 
has surely in so doing discharged any moral duty one 
might have.28
As I have shown, Wellman does not offer a purely instrumental 
justification for the duty to obey the law. Rather, Wellman offers 
an instrumental justification for the state (or political institutions, 
or a legal system): it is the only means for achieving a state of 
affairs in which all enjoy security. Wellman then offers a non-
instrumental justification for the claim that all moral agents 
have a duty to support it (even if their support is not necessary 
for the achievement of security), and, as we have just seen, the 
claim that support for the (or one’s own) state must take the 
form of obedience to law. Only by doing so, Wellman claims, 
can those with a duty to support the (same particular) state treat 
one another fairly. I conclude, therefore, that Simmons does 
not succeed in his attempt to show that, even granting him a 
duty to do one’s fair share in providing local security, Wellman 
cannot justify the claim that agents must obey the law in order 
to discharge this duty.
Note that this rebuttal of Simmons’ argument depends 
on the assumption, which for the sake of argument Simmons 
explicitly grants, that agents have a duty to do their fair share 
in the provision of local security. I have assumed that “local 
security” is synonymous with “security for one’s compatriots or 
fellow legal subjects,” an assumption I take Simmons to share 
in this context. As I discussed earlier, Simmons rightly points 
out that claims of fairness only gain traction once an agent 
has a duty to participate in a given collective action scheme 
(broadly construed). It is only because it is assumed that agents 
have a duty to provide local security—that is, to support their 
particular state—that it is possible to appeal to considerations 
of fairness to explain why their support must take the form of 
obedience to law.
III.
The preceding discussion highlights two important points 
regarding natural duty approaches to justifying a moral duty 
to obey the law. First, with respect to Simmons’ (and others’) 
many criticisms, recent examples that combine instrumental 
and non-instrumental arguments, such as Wellman’s appeal 
to both a samaritan duty of easy rescue and considerations of 
fairness, or my own appeal to the duty to promote basic moral 
rights and the duty to respect others’ equal claim to authority 
over the form morally necessary collective action ought to 
take, fare better than previous accounts such as Rawls’ and 
Waldron’s, which rely on instrumental arguments alone.29 Unlike 
those earlier defenses of political obligation, mixed accounts 
provide a plausible (and perhaps even compelling) justification 
for why all agents must support specifically political institutions 
if they are to fulfill certain of their natural duties, and why, if 
they have a duty to support the particular state in which they 
enjoy legal citizenship, that support must (at least) take the 
form of obedience to law. But, second, proving the antecedent 
of this last conditional claim continues to pose a challenge for 
advocates of natural duty approaches. Unless they can provide 
some justification for the claim that agents must support their 
particular state, those philosophers that ground their defense 
of political obligation in one or another natural duty will be 
unable to show that existing agents have a duty to obey the law 
of their state; indeed, they may be unable to show that agents 
have a duty to obey the law grounded in some natural duty in 
any world except one governed entirely by a single state or 
legal system.30
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